Perhaps only the leader of Belarus has passed the test by 100 percent. He noted that against the background of the most severe sanctions pressure, the postulates of unity and solidarity do not always work. This is evident from the voting in international organizations. With the tacit consent of our partners, Belarus and Russia are being defrauded and excluded from international organizations. Without the speedy consolidation of our countries, without strengthening political, economic, and military ties, we may not exist tomorrow!" The test of the CSTO leaders showed that there was a slight "out of sync" among the leaders of the CSTO countries who gathered for this anniversary summit in Moscow.
The report of the leader of Kazakhstan Tokayev was disorienting. He raised security issues, but not the actual ones that were expected of him. He ignored the recent assistance of the CSTO and raised the CSTO peacekeeping problem. The leaders of the CSTO countries measured the effectiveness of the organization by stopping the January crisis in Kazakhstan, and Pashinyan and Lukashenko exchanged attacks. It is understandable that Armenia was not supported by the CSTO when it asked for help.
In general, it was felt that the southern CSTO countries had not yet decided on the attitudes of the leader of Russia. Moreover, Russia had no moral right to demand support for its position in relation to Ukraine, since it began its actions without coordinating its actions with the CSTO countries.
The CSTO countries have yet to form these certainties, and this, in turn, will depend on several factors:
1. The result of Russia's own in Ukraine
2. Sanctions, economic and political influence of the United States and the West on the CSTO republics (Kazakhstan is most at risk).
3. Socio-economic tension in the CSTO countries caused by the deterioration of the economic condition caused by the events in Ukraine and the upcoming change in the world order.
These are the results of indirect testing of the CSTO countries. And what are the results of indirect testing of Russia itself? Russians are still far from an objective understanding of what is coming.
According to my socio-psychological express analysis conducted on the basis of social networks and the media, most Russians, in connection with the situation in Ukraine, live with the mindset of returning to their former comfort zone. There is a significant proportion of Russians for whom this problem of returning to former comfort is not worth it at all, since their comfort has not yet been violated. A considerable part of Russians are encouraged, thanks to the selective perception of optimistic Internet content. Another part of Russians is self-encouraging, ignoring both optimistic and alarmingly pessimistic information from the media and the Internet.
In general, most Russians have already partially adapted to the expectation that they will not be deprived of imports so problematic that it will cause them discomfort.
Many Russians still hope that the problems that are brewing and have not yet touched them will be short-lived. So far, an unconscious psychological defense is triggered, filled with optimistic expectations and short deadlines for solving the problem. Russians independently and intuitively build these optimistic deadlines on the basis of observing military, economic, political events, speeches by the president and regional Russian leaders, a significant depreciation of the dollar that is not available to Russians.
A small proportion of Russians, seeing that their lives and values have not changed significantly, rarely remember during the day about the situation of Russia in connection with Ukraine. There are also those who do not remember at all and do not even know about this situation, and without having senile dementia.
Thus, it is necessary to recognize that the economic and financial situation of Russians has not yet changed so significantly as to talk about socio-economic tension.
How long will this period of temporary insensitivity of Russians to sanctions last? At what stage of these sanctions will socio-economic tensions begin?
How long will it take until the moment when Russians who received decent stable salaries will feel that other times are coming?
How long will it take when Russians begin to have an objective understanding of the situation and expectations for a short-term return to their former lives disappear?
Russians have not yet left their comfort zone enough to expect a return to their former comfort zone.
So far, the comfort zone is violated only thanks to perceived information about events that are far from Russians.
(См. фильм Рамиля Гарифуллина "Режиссёр мозга" :